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Abstract. The introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality
into a model sometimes has little eect, and sometimes has a dramatic impact
on predicted behavior. We call a model robust to bounded rationality if small
deviations from rationality result only in small changes in the equilibrium set.
We also say that a model is structurally stable if the equilibrium set (given fully
rational agents) varies continuously with the parameter values of the model.
Our notions of a model and of rationality are quite broad, allowing us to
cover cases in which bounded rationality refers to imperfect optimization, non-
rational expectations, or arbitrary behavior by a subset of agents. We show that
a model is robust to bounded rationality if and only if it is structurally stable.
Thus, we can characterize which models will be robust to bounded rationality
and which ones will not, independently of the exact form that bounded ratio-
nality takes. In addition, from our characterization it follows that introducing
a small amount of bounded rationality will have large eects on predicted out-
comes if and only if parameters are near a critical point where the equilibrium
set changes in a discontinuous way.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The assumption of perfect rationality that underlies most economic models is far
too strict. Ideally, we would like a model of bounded rationality that ts observed
behavior and could be used as a basis for economic analysis. This is both an empirical
and a theoretical question which, for the moment, lacks a completely satisfactory
answer.1 For instance, Ido and Roth (1998) investigate how well simple learning
models t experimental data; while these simple models out-perform theories based
on perfect rationality they can still not be considered as complete descriptions of
actual behavior.
Given the diculty of constructing a fully specied procedural model of bounded
rationality it is interesting to ask how robust economic models are to relaxing the
assumption of perfect rationality. This allows us to investigate which models give
predictions that are unlikely to change much when we introduce a small amount
of bounded rationality, and which may be giving misleading predictions that rely
crucially on the assumption of perfect rationality.
We measure the degree of rationality by means of an arbitrary continuous function
that is normalized so that zero corresponds to full rationality. The advantage of
this somewhat abstract framework is that it captures many common approaches to
modeling bounded rationality. This allows us to study the impact of introducing
bounded rationality without having to specify the precise rationality measure under
consideration.
A problem with a more concrete approach is that many dierent measures of
rationality have been suggested. For example, in Radner (1980) the notion of -
Equilibrium is based on how far each agent's payo is from that obtained by a fully
rational agent. In macroeconomics and nance it is common to assume that most
1The literature on bounded rationality is vast and growing very rapidly. It would be fool-hardy
to even attempt a survey here. From a theoretical point of view, we refer to the two comprehensive
treatments of Weibull (1995) and Rubinstein (1998). An authoritative introduction to the vast
experimental literature is Roth (1995).Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 2
agents are fully rational, but some small proportion follow ad hoc or arbitrary rules; in
this case we can use the proportion of irrational agents in the model as our rationality
measure. In a rational expectations macro-model we could assume that each agent
maximizes given his beliefs, and measure rationality by how far an agent's beliefs
are from those of a fully rational agent. This way of proceeding may be particularly
relevant in learning models, since even if learning rules lead beliefs to converge, the
beliefs they generate are close to, but not perfectly, correct. However, as we shall see,
each of these suggested measures satises our assumption of continuity and in each
case a zero corresponds to full rationality. It follows that our results are applicable
in each case.
The issue of robustness of equilibria to bounded rationality has been investigated
in many specic models (Radner 1980, Conlisk 1980, Akerlof and Yellen 1985b, Akerlof
and Yellen 1985a, Mankiw 1985, Russell and Thaler 1985, Haltiwanger and Waldman
1985, Haltiwanger and Waldman 1989b, Haltiwanger and Waldman 1989a, Jones and
Stock 1987, Evans and Ramey 1992, Oh and Waldman 1994, Sethi and Franke 1995,
Bonm and Diebold 1997, among others). These papers show that introducing a
small amount of bounded rationality makes little dierence in some situations but
can have a large impact in others. The aim of this paper is to address the issue in
a general setting and develop a characterization of which models are robust to small
amounts of bounded rationality and which ones are not.
We begin by dening an abstract framework within which we dene a model that
depends on some exogenously given parameters, and an equilibrium notion. In ad-
dition, we assume that for all parameter values of the model an equilibrium (with
full rationality) exists. Many economic models t the abstract framework that we
dene below: we give as explicit examples N-player normal form games, a general
equilibrium (pure exchange) model, a macroeconomic model with strategic comple-
mentarities, and a rational expectations macroeconomic model.
We dene a model as robust to bounded rationality if small deviations from ra-
tionality result in only small changes in the equilibrium set. We then introduce
the notion of structural stability: a model is structurally stable if the equilibriumStructural Stability and Bounded Rationality 3
set (under full rationality) varies continuously with changes in the parameter val-
ues. Structural stability fails at critical parameter values where the equilibrium set
changes in a discontinuous way. Note that this is also a form a robustness; predictions
in structurally stable models will be robust to small changes in the parameter values
while predictions in models that are not structurally stable will not be robust near
critical parameter values.
We show that there is a strong connection between the notions of robustness to
bounded rationality and structural stability for the class of models we investigate. In
particular, a model is robust to bounded rationality if and only if it is structurally
stable. As a corollary of this result we have that introducing a small amount of
bounded rationality has, and can only have, a large eect on behavior in a model
near critical parameter values, where the equilibrium set is changing in a discontinuous
way.
Intuitively, with a small amount of bounded rationality, observed outcomes may
be close to fully rational behavior, or may be close to fully rational behavior for
nearby parameter values. This cannot change outcomes much in a structurally stable
model, but it can have large eects near critical parameter values in a model that
is not structurally stable. Equilibria that suddenly disappear as we move away from
critical parameter values, live on in the neighborhood of the critical parameter values
as boundedly rational equilibria. Indeed, we show that this is the only way in which a
small amount of bounded rationality can have a big impact on behavior. This intuition
is similar to that used by Fudenberg and Levine (1986) who use -Equilibria in nite
approximations to games with innite strategy sets to characterize the (fully rational)
equilibria in the limit, even when the equilibrium set is not continuous at the limit.
Our general result, characterizing robustness to bounded rationality via the struc-
tural stability of the equilibrium mapping provides a simple method for analyzing
the eects of bounded rationality in many specic models, independently of the exact
nature of the bounded rationality. All that needs to be done is to study the structural
stability of the model with fully rational agents and identify the critical parameter
values.Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 4
1.2. Overview
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our
abstract framework in full detail. In Section 3 we rst set up the apparatus that
allows us to dene robustness to bounded rationality and structural stability for a
model, and then we proceed to state the main result of the paper. In Section 4 we
briey discuss the relationship between our results and the literature on equilibrium
renements and bounded rationality.
Section 5 contains four leading examples that t the class of models described
in Section 2. These are, nite strategic-form games (Subsection 5.1), pure exchange
general equilibrium (Subsection 5.2), a macroeconomic model with strategic com-
plementarities (Subsection 5.3), and a rational expectations macroeconomic model
(Subsection 5.4).
Section 6 contains some brief concluding remarks. For ease of exposition, all proofs
are relegated to the Appendix. The Appendix also contains some standard denitions
concerning compact-valued correspondences that we reproduce there purely for the
sake of completeness. In the numbering of equations, Denitions, Lemmas and so on,
a prex of \A" means that the corresponding item is to be found in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We start by dening the primitives of our analysis. For reasons of generality, we
work with an abstract formulation of what constitutes a model and the associated
rationality function.
The abstract framework which we set up now can be thought of intuitively as
a parameterized class of `generalized games' together with an associated abstract
rationality function. We choose this way to proceed because it guarantees that our
framework is suciently general to encompass many interesting economic models as
is shown by the examples that we analyze in Section 5 below.
Definition 1 [Model]: A model M consists of a quadruple (;A;F;R) with the
following interpretation.Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 5
The set , with typical element , is the parameter space, while A, with typical
element a, is the action space.
The correspondence F :   A  A is the feasibility correspondence2 that asso-
ciates a subset of A to each element of   A.
The feasibility correspondence F clearly induces a further correspondence from 
into A, which we denote by C and we refer to as the consistent actions correspondence.
Formally, given F, we dene C :   A by setting C() = fa 2 A such that a 2
F(;a)g.
Finally, we let G    A be the graph of the consistent actions correspondence
C so that G = f(;a) 2   A such that a 2 C()g. This enables us to dene R : G
! IR+ as the rationality function for the model.
We can think of the rationality function as measuring how far the actions chosen
in the model are from a fully rational choices. We shall take a value of zero of the
rationality function to denote full rationality and assume that the degree of rationality
decreases as the value of the rationality function increases.
Within the abstract framework that we have just dened, we focus on the class of
models that satisfy the following three properties.
Assumption 1 [Compactness]:  and A are both compact subsets of some complete
separable metric spaces. Throughout the paper, d and dA denote the metrics used
on  and A respectively.
Assumption 2 [Continuity of Consistent Actions]: The consistent actions correspo-
ndence C :   A is non-empty, continuous and compact-valued.3
2Throughout the paper, the symbol  between two sets, say A and B, denotes a correspondence
that associates a subset of B to each element of A, while, as is standard, ! denotes a function
associating an element of B to each element of A.
3The denition of a continuous correspondence that we use is the standard one. A correspondence
is continuous if and only if it is both upper hemicontinuous and lower hemicontinuous. See Denitions
A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 6
Assumption 3 [Continuous Rationality]: The rationality function R : G ! IR+ is
continuous.
Given any , the set of -Equilibria consists of those consistent actions which are
within  of full rationality.
Definition 2 [-Equilibrium]: Given M, any  2 , and any   0, the set of
-Equilibria at  is dened as
E(;) = fa 2 A such that a 2 C() and R(;a)  g (1)
Note that the term -Equilibrium is usually taken to mean that agents are within
 of their maximal payo in a game. Here, we use this term in the expanded sense
of being within  of full rationality according to an arbitrary rationality function
associated with a model.
A special case of -Equilibria occurs when  = 0, and we obtain the equilibrium
set of the model under full rationality.
Definition 3 [Equilibrium]: Given M and any  2 , the equilibrium set at  is
dened as E(;0). Sometimes the equilibrium set at  will be denoted simply by
E().
Note that we use the mapping E in several senses. In general, it denotes the set of
-Equilibria at a parameter value . Sometimes, however, it is useful to think of how
the equilibrium set varies with  for a xed  or of how it varies with  for a xed .
Sometimes we will write E(;) as E(), depending on what is convenient. In what
follows no confusion should arise in the multiple uses of the notation E.
Assumption 4 [Existence]: For every  2  the equilibrium set E() is not empty.Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 7
Clearly, Assumption 4 ensures that the set E(;) is also non-empty for every
 2  and for every   0. A great deal of eort has gone into proving the existence
of an equilibrium for certain models. Here we are concerned only with the robustness
of the equilibrium set once it has been established that an equilibrium exists.
We conclude this section with a preliminary result that characterizes a useful
property of our set up which will be useful below.
Lemma 1 [-Equilibrium Correspondence]: The correspondence E(;) is compact-
valued and upper hemicontinuous.
3. Structural Stability and Robustness to -Equilibria
The central question with which we are concerned is how the equilibrium set changes
when we allow agents to be boundedly rational. To study this question we clearly
need to be able to measure the distance between two sets.
Definition 4 [Haussdorf Metric]: Let (X;dX) be a metric space, and let Q(X) be
the collection of all closed, nonempty subsets of X. Throughout the rest of the paper,
the Hausdor distance induced by dX between two sets A;B 2 Q(X) is denoted by
hX and is dened as
hX(A;B) = sup

sup
a2A

inf
b2B
dX(a;b)

; sup
b2B

inf
a2A
dX(a;b)

(2)
Since our -Equilibrium Correspondence is compact-valued, the sets of actions
that it generates are certainly closed. It follows that we can apply the Hausdor
metric hA induced by dA to measure the distance between them.
We now state the denition of robustness to bounded rationality which we will
work with for the rest of the paper.
Definition 5 [Robustness]: The model M = (;A;F;R) is robust to -Equilibria
if and only if
8 > 0; 9 > 0 such that  <  ) hA[E(;);E()] < ; 8 2  (3)Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 8
In other words, a model is robust to-Equilibria if and only if for  suciently small,
the -Equilibrium set is close to the equilibrium set.
Notice that we require the value of  in (3) to be independent of . Intuitively,
to call a model robust to -Equilibria we require that, as  becomes small, the -
Equilibrium set should be close to the actual equilibrium set in a manner that can
be `predicted' purely on the basis of the degree bounded rationality present in the
model.
Another way to look at Denition 5 is as follows. Let Q(A) be the set of all
closed nonempty subsets of A. We can then view the -Equilibrium Correspondence
E : IR+  A as a function E
 : IR+ ! Q(A).
Studying the properties of E and studying the properties of E
 are largely equiv-
alent exercises. Our next lemma shows that continuity of the correspondence E is
equivalent to continuity of the function E
 in the Hausdor metric.4
Lemma 2 [Hausdor Continuity]: Let (Y;dY) be a complete separable metric space,
Q(Y ) be the set of all closed nonempty subsets of Y , and hY be the Hausdor metric
induced by dX on Q(Y ) as in Denition 4. Let X be a compact subset of a complete
separable metric space, and f : X  Y be a compact-valued correspondence. Next
consider the function g : X ! Q(Y ) which is equivalent to f in the sense that for
every x 2 X we have that g(x) = f(x). Then f is a continuous correspondence (see
Denition A.3) if and only if g is a continuous function in the Hausdor metric hY.
From the denition of equicontinuity we then immediately have the following,
which is stated without proof (see denition A.4 in the Appendix).
Remark 1 [Equicontinuity]: The model M = (;A;F;R) is robust to -Equilibria
if and only if the family of functions E
() is equicontinuous at  = 0.
4Lemma 2 below is stated without proof since it is a standard result. See for instance Hildenbrand
(1974, Problem I.B.4)Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 9
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E(;)
Figure 1: Equilibria and -Equilibria
A weaker notion of robustness to bounded rationality would be to insist only that
the -Equilibrium correspondence is continuous at zero for each parameter value.
However, such a denition has no bite; every model satisfying our assumptions would
be robust to bounded rationality in this sense of the term. This is the content of our
next preliminary result.
Lemma 3 [Continuity at = 0]: For every  2 , the correspondence E() is con-
tinuous at  = 0.
Note that E need not be continuous everywhere, only at zero. Lemma 3 implies
that, for given , small deviations from rationality will have only a small eect on
the equilibrium set.
This idea is captured in Figure 1. For xed , as  decreases, the -Equilibrium
set (between the two thinner curves in Figure 1) converges the equilibrium set. How-
ever, the equilibrium set (the heavier line in Figure 1) need not be continuous in .Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 10
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Figure 2: Critical Parameter Values
Therefore, for xed  > 0 we can always nd a  such that the set of -Equilibria is
`far' from the actual equilibrium set. This is the problem captured in our denition
of robustness to bounded rationality above.
We dene a model to be structurally stable if a small change in its parameters
leads to a correspondingly small change in the equilibrium set. In our denition of
structural stability below we focus on the continuity of the equilibrium correspondence
as the parameters vary.
Definition 6 [Structural Stability]: The model M = (;A;F;R) is structurally
stable if and only if the equilibrium correspondence E :   A is continuous.
Figure 2 shows, again, the equilibrium correspondence for a model that is not
structurally stable. We can dene the parameters of the model as being at a critical
value if the equilibrium mapping is not continuous at that value. As  increases to
reach the critical point 1 the equilibrium set suddenly jumps in size to include aStructural Stability and Bounded Rationality 11
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Figure 3: -Equilibria at Critical Values
new point. Similarly, as  decreases to 2 the equilibrium set suddenly increases in
size. Note that, by Lemma 1, the equilibrium mapping is upper hemicontinuous; the
problem is that it looses lower hemicontinuity at the critical points.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1 [Robustness and Stability]: The model M = (;A;F;R) is robust to
-Equilibria if and only if it is structurally stable.
The intuition behind the proof of Theorem 1 is that as we move away from crit-
ical values of the parameters the equilibrium set suddenly gets smaller. However,
the equilibria that disappear live on in the form of -Equilibria at nearby param-
eter values. Figure 3 shows once more the equilibrium set for a model that is not
structurally stable (the heavier curve), this time together with the set of -Equilibria
for the model (the points between the two thinner curves). For parameters near the
critical values we can always nd-Equilibria that are far from the equilibrium set forStructural Stability and Bounded Rationality 12
that parameter. No matter how small we make , the problem persists for parameters
suciently close to the critical values.
Therefore, for parameters suciently close to the critical values, the set of -
Equilibria must be far from the equilibrium set under full rationality. Conversely, for
parameters that are not near the critical values, a small amount of bounded rationality
cannot have a disproportionately large impact on the equilibria of the model.
4. Equilibrium Selection and Bounded Rationality
It is immediate from Denition 2 above that the approach we have taken in this paper
leads us to view bounded rationality as a weaker notion than full rationality; a fully
rational equilibrium is always an -Equilibrium under bounded rationality. This is
a little at odds with the literature on using bounded rationality as an equilibrium
selection device. In that literature (Selten 1975, Myerson 1978, among very many
others) a fully rational equilibrium is not always boundedly rational, and this can be
used as a renement of equilibrium.
Since our basic approach has been to argue that bounded rationality always in-
creases the size of the equilibrium set, our notion of bounded rationality can never act
as a selection device. To use bounded rationality as an equilibrium selection device
the fully rational model must not automatically satisfy the conditions of bounded
rationality.
However, equilibrium selection can be reconciled with our framework by replacing
our denition of an -Equilibrium having a rationality level at most  with the de-
nition of an `Exact' -Equilibrium with a rationality level exactly equal to . In this
way, a fully rational equilibrium need not be an equilibrium under bounded rational-
ity. We can then dene a `Perfect' equilibrium as the limit of any sequence of such
Exact -Equilibria as  approaches zero. Our next denition formalizes the notion
we have just outlined.
Definition 7 [Exact -Equilibrium]: Given M, any  2 , and any  > 0, the setStructural Stability and Bounded Rationality 13
of Exact -Equilibria at  is dened as
E
X(;) = fa 2 A such that a 2 C() and R(;a) = g (4)
Taking the limit of Exact -Equilibria as  shrinks to zero, gives us the set of
Perfect Equilibria.
Definition 8 [Perfect Equilibrium]: Given M and any  2 , the set of Perfect
Equilibria at  is dened as the limit of any sequence of Exact -Equilibria as  ! 0.
Our next remark shows that, if we restrict ourselves to Exact -Equilibria, then
our set up is consistent with the use of bounded rationality as an equilibrium selection
device.
Remark 2 [Rational Equilibria and Perfect Equilibria]: Given M and any  2 ,
the set of Perfect Equilibria at  is (weakly) contained in the set E() of fully rational
equilibria.
5. Examples
5.1. Finite Strategic-Form Games
Our rst example of a class of economic models that t Denition 1 above, and at the
same time satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 is that of Finite Strategic-Form Games.
Consider the following set of nite-action strategic-form N-player games. For each
player n, x a nite action set n, and let mn denote the cardinality of n, while 
denotes the joint action set. Let also Q = N
QM
n=1 mn. Next, let  2 IR
Q denote the
array of all possible payo vectors corresponding to all possible action proles . We
take the metric d on the space of all possible  to be the standard Euclidean metric,
and we assume that  is restricted to lie in some compact subset  of IR
Q.
For each player n let An be the set of mixed strategies available to player n in the
game above. Let also A be the set of all possible mixed strategy proles. Clearly,Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 14
A is a nite-dimensional Euclidean space. We take dA to be the standard Euclidean
metric on A.
The feasibility correspondence in this case is straightforward since all mixed strate-
gies in An are always available to n, regardless of the strategies of other players and
of the value of . Hence we set F(;a) = A for every  2  and for every a 2 A.5
The payos to each player n in the mixed extension of game that we now consider
can be written as n(;an;a n). A natural rationality function for player n is given
by
Rn(;a) = max
~ an2An
n(;~ an;a n)   n(;a) (5)
We take the overall rationality function to be R = maxfR1; :::; RNg, with each
component dened as in (5).
The model M = (;A;F;R) that we have just dened clearly satises Assump-
tion 1 by construction, and it trivially satises Assumption 2. By the maximum
theorem of Berge (1963), each component of the rationality function dened in (5) is
continuous, and therefore R is continuous as required. Hence M satises Assumption
3. Finally, every nite-action strategic-form N-player game has a Nash equilibrium
in mixed strategies as shown by Nash (1950). Therefore M satises Assumption 4.
Examples of critical parameter values at which the equilibrium correspondence of
M looses lower hemicontinuity are not hard to nd. For instance, if we let  tend to
the vector of zero payos for all players and for all possible outcomes of the game,
we approach a critical point. There is an interesting interpretation of this case if
we think of the limit described above as a process of scaling down payos, say by
multiplying them all by a scalar that shrinks to zero. In this case, we can interpret
Theorem 1 as telling us that the scale of payos (in absolute value), relative to the
scale of bounded rationality () matters in determining whether the introduction of
bounded rationality has a small or a large eect on the equilibrium set. This may be
5Notice that this implies that the consistent actions correspondence is also straightforward in
this case since F as above implies that C() = A for every  2 .Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 15
a matter of concern for a variety of experimental settings since the scale of payos
there is often limited by budget constraints.
Less trivial examples can be constructed exploiting the topological properties of
the Nash equilibrium correspondence for nite strategic-form games (Wu and Jia-He
1962, Wilson 1971, Harsanyi 1973). For instance, we know that every nite strategic
form game that has a continuum of Nash equilibria, must be one at which the Nash
equilibrium correspondence loses lower hemicontinuity. In this case we can be assured
that robustness to bounded rationality also fails.
5.2. Pure Exchange General Equilibrium
Our second example of a class of models that ts our framework it that of a set of
Pure Exchange General Equilibrium models.
Consider a pure exchange economy with L goods and N   1 traders, indexed by
n = 1;:::;N   1, dened as follows.
Un : IR
L ! IR is the utility function of trader n, assumed to be continuous,
without local maxima and strictly quasi-concave over the consumption set IR
L
+. Let
n = (1
n;:::;L
n) 2 IR
L
++ be the endowment vector of trader n, while  2 IR
L(N 1)
++
represents the array of endowments in the economy. Assume that  is constrained to
lie in some compact subset  of IR
L(N 1)
++ . For every  2 , let r() = [r1();:::;rL()]
be the vector of aggregate endowments of each good in the economy, and let r be the
L-dimensional vector with components r` = max2 r`() for ` = 1;:::;L. Notice
that since  is compact, the vector r is well dened. Let B be the set of vectors an 2
IR
L
+ which satisfy a`
n  r` for every ` = 1;:::;L. Finally, for every n = 1;:::;N  1
let An = IR
L
+ \ B.
The N-th agent in the economy is the auctioneer. Let AN be the L 1-dimensional
simplex L 1, and nally let A =
N

n=1
An. We take both  and A to be equipped
with their respective standard Euclidean metrics.
The feasibility correspondence for each trader is given by the budget sets. ForStructural Stability and Bounded Rationality 16
every n = 1;:::N   1, let
Fn(;a) =
(
an 2 An such that
L X
`=1
a
`
Na
`
n 
L X
`=1
a
`
N
`
n
)
(6)
The feasibility correspondence for the auctioneer is trivial since he call any prices in
AN, regardless of  and of the actions of traders n = 1;:::;N   1. In other words,
we take it to be the case that
FN(;a) = AN 8 2 ; 8a 2 A (7)
We take the overall feasibility correspondence to be given by F = (F1;:::;FN), with
each component dened as in (6) and in (7).
A natural rationality function for every trader n = 1;:::;N   1 is given by
Rn(;a) = max
~ an2An
Un(~ an)   Un(an)
s:t: ~ an 2 Fn(;a)
(8)
To obtain market clearing, the best that the auctioneer can do is to set prices so
as to maximize the value of aggregate excess demand. Therefore, a natural rationality
function for the auctioneer is given by
RN(;a) = max
~ aN2AN
L X
`=1
~ a
`
N
"
N 1 X
n=1
a
`
n  
N 1 X
n=1

`
n
#
 
L X
`=1
a
`
N
"
N 1 X
n=1
a
`
n  
N 1 X
n=1

`
n
#
(9)
We take the overall rationality function to be R = maxfR1; :::; RNg, with each
component dened as in (8) and in (9).
The model M = (;A;F;R) that we have just dened clearly satises Assump-
tion 1 by construction.
Since we have bounded the action of traders n = 1;:::;N   1 to be in An =
IR
L
++ \ B, every component of the feasibility correspondence dened in (6) is in
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also continuous. It is then a matter of routine to check that the consistent actions
correspondence C induced by F is continuous. Therefore M satises Assumption 2.
By the maximum theorem (Berge 1963), each component of the rationality func-
tion dened in (8) and in (9) is continuous, and therefore R is continuous as required.
Hence M satises Assumption 3.
Finally, it is well known that every pure exchange economy satisfying our assump-
tions has a competitive equilibrium (Debreu 1952, Arrow and Debreu 1954, Debreu
1959). Therefore M satises Assumption 4.
Clearly, the model that we have described involves -rationality from the part of
the traders and of the auctioneer. However, we can adapt the set up to encompass
one other possible interesting case; rational traders with an -rational auctioneer so
that while traders are rational we only obtain approximate market-clearing.6
To look at this case, we need to modify the both the feasibility correspondence
and the rationality function of M. The feasibility correspondence for the auctioneer
remains as in (7), while the feasibility correspondence for each trader is constructed
so that they are forced to pick the utility-maximizing actions given their budget sets.
In other words, for every n = 1;:::;N   1, we set
Fn(;a) = arg max
an2An
Un(an)
s:t:
L X
`=1
a
`
Na
`
n 
L X
`=1
a
`
N
`
n
an 2 An
(10)
Notice, that since the preferences of all traders are assumed to be strictly quasi-
concave, the new feasibility correspondence that we have dened is continuous as
before, and hence it is again a matter of routine to check that our new model satises
Assumption 2.
6Since -rational traders can choose any consumption bundle in a set with a non-empty interior,
the symmetric case of exact market-clearing with -rational traders is hard to accommodate in our
set up. Whatever the prices picked by the auctioneer, market-clearing cannot be guaranteed.Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 18
The rationality function of the new model is simply set to be equal to the auction-
eer component of the rationality function of the previous case, as in (9). Therefore, the
new model satises Assumption 3. Finally, the new model always has an equilibrium
for exactly the same reasons as before. Hence it satises Assumption 4.
Classes of pure exchange economies which are not structurally stable are not
dicult to nd. All we need to nd is a set of pure exchange economies that includes
one or more `critical' endowment vectors. When utility functions are smooth, such
examples can be constructed in well known ways.7 For example, let 0 be an array of
endowments for which a unique equilibrium price vector exists (for instance because
the array of endowments is itself a Pareto-ecient allocation). Let also 00 be an array
of endowments for which there exists multiple, say three, equilibrium price vectors.
Then as we move the parameters of the economy from 0 to 00 (for instance taking the
linear combinations of these two extreme points) we must `cross' a critical economy 
where the equilibrium correspondence looses lower hemicontinuity.8 Hence, the model
will be neither structurally stable nor robust to bounded rationality. For parameter
values near , the introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality will have a
large eect on the equilibrium set.
5.3. A Macroeconomic Model with Strategic Complementarities
The model in this section is a simplied version of the model in Haltiwanger and
Waldman (1989a). In this framework there is a positive feed back from the aggregate
level of economic activity to each individual's optimal activity level (strategic com-
plementarity). Most agents optimize given their beliefs which are based on rational
expectations but a small number of people in the model follow an ad hoc expectation
formation mechanism. For simplicity, we assume they have xed expectations. The
measure of rationality in this model is the proportion of people who follow the simple
(non-rational) expectations rule.
7See for instance Mas-Colell (1985) or Balasko (1988).
8Our claim here is a direct consequence of known results. See for instance Balasko (1988),
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There is a continuum of agents of size one indexed by n. Each agent must decide
whether to produce one unit of output this period or not. The earnings from pro-
ducing output are r =  +  Y where  and  are xed parameters and Y is the
aggregate level of output. Set against this is the cost of production c. For each agent,
the cost of production is a random draw with uniform distribution on the interval
[0;1]. This cost is known to the agent.
A proportion  of the agents are of bounded rationality and simply set their
expected earnings to re = s: The others, a fraction 1   , have rational expectations
and set re = E(r).
Agents with production costs less than their expected earning will decide to pro-
duce output, while those with costs above their expected earnings will remain idle.
Therefore, total output under these expectation formation rules is given by
Y (r
e;;s) = (1   )
re Z
0
dn + 
s Z
0
dn = (1   )r
e +  s (11)
together with
r
e =  +  Y (r
e;;s) (12)
Notice that once expected earnings are one or more, all the agents with rational
expectations produce output.
The model embodied in (11) and (12) can be tted in our framework in a fairly
straightforward way. We take the parameter space of the model to have typical
element  = (;;s): We assume that ,  and s are all constrained to lie in the
closed interval [0;1].
It is convenient to include the proportion of agents  who are boundedly rational
as an element of the `action' component of the model.9 We take the action space
9Of course, this should not be interpreted literally. As will become clear in a moment, it is simply
a device to t the model we have just outlined into the class of models to which Theorem 1 applies.Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 20
of the model to have typical element a = (;re;Y ); the rational agents must decide
on their expectations and we must set aggregate output. We assume that each of
, re and Y lie in the unit interval [0;1]. We take the metric on  and A to be
the standard Euclidean one. Therefore it is clear that the model we have described
satises Assumption 1.
We dene the rationality function of the model to be simply given by
R(;a) =  (13)
so that it is trivial that the rationality function is continuous as required by Assump-
tion 3.
The feasibility correspondence is constructed so that aggregate output must satisfy
(11) and expectations are indeed rational. In other words, for every  and a, we set
F(;a) to be the following set
fa 2 A j  2 [0;1] and r
e = minf1; + Y g and Y = (1   )r
e + sg (14)
Notice in (14) we have bounded re above by 1. This is without loss of generality
since, as we noted above, once expected returns are 1 or more, all rational agents in
the model produce one unit of output.
It is easy to show that the consistent actions correspondence C induced by F
dened in (14) is as follows. When  = (;;s) 6= (0;1;s), we have that C() is the
set of triplets (;re;Y ) that satisfy
 2 [0;1] r
e = min

1; + 
(1   ) + s
1   (1   )

Y = min

1;
(1   ) + s
1   (1   )

(15)
while when  = (;;s) = (0;1;s), we have that C() is the set of triplets (;re;Y )
that satisfy either
 2 (0;1]; r
e = minf1; + sg; Y = s (16)Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 21
or
 = 0; r
e 2 [0;1]; Y = r
e (17)
By inspection, it is straightforward to show that the consistent actions correspondence
dened in (15), (16) and (17) is continuous over . Therefore the model satises
Assumption 2 as required.
The (fully rational) equilibria of the model are easy to compute given (11) and
(12), and using the fact that we have bounded above re above by 1. When  < 1
there is a unique equilibrium given by
r
e = min

1; + 

1   

and Y = min

1;

1   

(18)
When  = 1 and  > 0, there is also a unique equilibrium given by
r
e = minf1; + g = 1 and Y = 1 (19)
Finally, when  = 1 and  = 0 there is a continuum of equilibria given by
r
e = 2 [0;1] and Y = r
e (20)
In this case, any level of output can be sustained as an equilibrium by the expectation
that exactly that level of output will be produced.
Clearly, it follows from (18), (19) and (20) that the model's equilibrium set is
non-empty for any parameter values. Therefore, the model satises Assumption 4 as
required.
It is also evident from (18), (19) and (20) that the equilibrium correspondence is
not continuous at ( = 1;  = 0) since at this point it changes from a unique value to
a continuum. The model is structurally unstable. It follows from Theorem 1 above
that the equilibrium is not robust to introducing a small about of bounded rationality
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The non-robustness of the model to bounded rationality near this critical point can
be seen more directly in the following way. Given a xed proportion  of boundedly
rational agents, for  < 1 the model we have described has a unique equilibrium given
by
r
e = min

1; + 
(1   ) + s
1   (1   )

and Y = min

1;
(1   ) + s
1   (1   )

(21)
Notice now that for any given positive value of , as  ! 1 and  ! 0, the formulae
in (21) tell us that re ! s and Y ! s. In other words, no matter how small we choose
to make , for parameter values suciently close to  = 1 and  = 0, we can nd a
boundedly rational equilibrium which is arbitrarily close to re = s and Y = s. These
values can be quite far (depending on the `direction' from which  = 1 and  = 0 is
being approached) from the fully rational equilibrium given by (18).
Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989a) work a more complex model that has a similar
structure to the one we have used here. They limit their investigation to an open
set of parameter values for which there is a unique equilibrium in the fully rational
model. However, they note the existence of a continuum of equilibria for boundary
parameter values. Our results show that it is precisely this structural instability in
the model at the boundary that drives the fact that their model is not robust to
bounded rationality near the boundary of the parameter space.
5.4. A Rational Expectations Macroeconomic Model
Our last example focuses on the eect of relaxing the constraint that agents have
rational expectations in a macroeconomic model. We take as a measure of bounded
rationality the dierence between the agents' subjective expectation and the actual
expected value of the variable given their information. Our goal is to investigate if
a small amount of bounded rationality in this sense can have large repercussions on
behavior and outcomes.
The rational expectation macroeconomic model that we work with in this section
is taken from Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Ch. 10.3)Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 23
Aggregate demand is given by
y
d = m   p + v (22)
where m is the money stock, p is the price level and v is a non-degenerate random
shock with an expected value of zero.
The equation for aggregate supply is
y
s = (p   w + u) (23)
where w is the wage rate, u is a non-degenerate random shock with an expected value
of zero, and  is a non-negative constant. Labor demand is given by
n
d = (p   w + u) (24)
with  and  non-negative constants. Labor supply is written as
n
s = (w   p) (25)
where  is a non-negative constant.
To these behavioral relationships they add the market clearing condition
y
d = y
s (26)
In other words, market clearing in the goods market occurs automatically through
exible prices.
On the other hand, the labor market need not clear. Instead, wages are set so that
expected labor demand equals expected labor supply. Under full rationality (rational
expectations) the wage is set so that
E[n
d] = E[n
s] (27)Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 24
where E[] denotes the `rational' expectation of a given variable, namely the expected
value of that variable conditional on all available information.10
The microeconomic foundations of this canonical model (with rational expecta-
tions) are discussed at length in Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and we will not repeat
their discussion here. Instead, we begin by identifying the solution to the model under
full rationality. This a useful benchmark case from which to start. Using (24) and
(25), the fact that the wage must clear the labor market in expected terms, as given
by (27), yields that
( + )E[p] = ( + )w (28)
Using market clearing in the goods market we can then determine the price level as
follows
p =
m + v + (w   u)
1 + 
(29)
Using (28) and (29), it immediate to see that if ( +) > 0 then the model has a
unique equilibrium under full rationality given by
w = m and p =
m + v + (w   u)
1 + 
= m +
v   u
1 + 
(30)
When  +  = 0, equation (28) does not pin down the equilibrium wage anymore.
In this case we assume that the wage can only take values in a given interval [0;w].
Therefore, when  + = 0, the model has continuum of fully rational equilibria given
by
w 2 [0;w] and p =
m + v + (w   u)
1 + 
(31)
In terms of the abstract framework that we dened in Section 2, we dene a typical
10Note that, later on, when we allow bounded rationality into the model, equation (27) will no
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element of the parameter space of the model as
 = (;;;;m;u;v) (32)
Note that in this specication we treat the actual realizations of the random variables
as parameters.
A typical element of the action space is
a = (w;p) (33)
Note that the other outcomes, output and employment, can be written as simple
functions of wages and prices using the behavioral equations of the model above.
To make the model t our abstract framework developed in Section 2 we assume
that the parameter and action spaces are compact subsets of IR. In other words, we
assume that the parameters and action variables of the model satisfy11;12
 2 [0;1]  2 [0;]  2 [0;]  2 [0;]
m 2 [0;m] w 2 [0;w u 2 [u;u] v 2 [v;v]]
p 2 [v   u;m + v + w   u]
(34)
Clearly, given (34), the model satises Assumption 1.
We assume that wages are set on the basis that the labor market is expected to
clear, but these expectations need not be correct. The measure of bounded rationality
in the model is given by how far from clearing (because of non-rational expectations)
the labor market is. We dene the rationality function for the model as
11Note that since we are assuming that E[v] = E[u] = 0, and since the random shocks are non-
degenerate, it follows that in (34) above we have that v < 0, u < 0, v > 0 and u > 0. We also
assume that w  m, and that , , , m and w are all strictly positive.
12Note that the bounds for p in (34) are simply the result of plugging the bounds for all other
variables and parameters of the model into the expression for p in (30) above.Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 26
R(;a) =
 E(n
d   n
s)
  (35)
In other words, under bounded rationality, in an -Equilibrium, the wage is set so
that the absolute value of the expected excess demand for labor is  or less.
Given wages, we can determine prices using the equilibrium condition in the goods
market. The feasibility correspondence constrains the price level to be the one that
clears the goods market. In other words, we set
F(;a) =

w 2 [0;w]; p =
m + v + (w   u)
1 + 

(36)
Notice next that, given (36), the consistent actions correspondence is simply given
by C() = F(;a). Therefore, by inspection of (36), the model satises Assumption
2 as required.
Taking expectations, the rationality function dened in (35) can be re-written as
R(;a) = ( + ) jE[p]   wj = ( + )
   
m   w
1 + 
    (37)
Clearly, (37) shows that the rationality function is continuous as required, and there-
fore the model satises Assumption 3. It is also immediate that R(;a) = 0 corre-
sponds to the equilibrium set of the original model with full rationality. Since we
have already explicitly computed the equilibria of the model under full rationality13
this is also enough to show that Assumption 4 is satised by the model. Hence, the
model satises all the assumptions required by Theorem 1.
However, the model is not structurally stable since it is immediate from (30) and
(31) that the equilibrium correspondence is discontinuous at ( + ) = 0. Therefore,
by Theorem 1, the model is not robust to bounded rationality in the neighborhood
of this point.
13See (30) and (31) above.Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 27
Intuitively, what is happening is that  and  measure the elasticity of the demand
and supply of labor with respect to the wage at the equilibrium point. Near the critical
parameter values the demand and supply curves are very inelastic; small mistakes in
predicting labor demand or supply can have arbitrarily large implications for nominal
wage setting. These mistakes in nominal wage setting then have large impacts on
prices and output (provided that  > 0).
To see this more directly, note that for parameters near the critical point, we can
set the wage arbitrarily and still be epsilon-rational since R(;a) = ( + )j(m  
w)=(1 + )j remains small. In other words, for any w 2 [0;w] and for any  > 0
there exist a z > 0 such that whenever 0 <  +  < z, we can be sure that w is
an -Equilibrium of the model. Clearly, this can be quite far from the unique fully
rational equilibrium of the model, which, given (30), has w = m.
Blanchard and Fischer (1989) analyze only the case where there is a unique ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium by assuming  > 0. We have extended the equilibrium
analysis to include  = 0. However, simply assuming  > 0 does not get rid of the
problem. If bounded rationality takes the form of expectations that are close to, but
not quite rational, then when  +  is positive, but small, the model is not robust to
bounded rationality.
6. Conclusions
The study of the eects of small amounts of bounded rationality can be carried
out in many cases simply by studying the structural stability of the equilibrium
correspondence. This should greatly simplify the theoretical study of the impact
of bounded rationality in particular models. In addition, since our results hold for
any continuous rationality function, once we have studied robustness to one type of
bounded rationality we can generalize the results to many other types.
Our results also have implications for experimental economics. Even in cases
where an experimental situation has a unique equilibrium prediction, our results sug-
gest that small deviations from full rationality will have a large impact on observedStructural Stability and Bounded Rationality 28
behavior if and only if the experimental setup is close to a critical value, where equi-
librium behavior becomes structurally unstable. Failure of equilibrium predictions
in such cases is not surprising, and might not lead us to abandon the assumption of
rational (or close to rational) behavior. However, large scale failure of equilibrium
predictions in experimental settings that are far from critical values of the equilib-
rium correspondence, does undermine the assumption of rational (or close to rational)
behavior.
APPENDIX
A.1. Definitions
For the sake of completeness, we begin with some standard denitions14 which are used throughout
the paper.
Definition A.1 [Upper Hemicontinuity]: Let X and Y be complete separable metric spaces. The
compact-valued correspondence H : X  Y is upper hemicontinuous at x if and only if given any
sequence fxn;yng such that xn ! x, yn ! y, and yn 2 H(xn) for every n, we have that y 2 H(x).
The compact-valued correspondence H : X  Y is upper hemicontinuous if an only if it is upper
hemicontinuous at every x 2 X.
Definition A.2 [Lower Hemicontinuity]: Let X and Y be complete separable metric spaces. The
compact-valued correspondence H : X  Y is lower hemicontinuous at x if and only if xn ! x and
y 2 H(x) imply that there exists a sequence fyng such that yn 2 H(xn) for every n and yn ! y.
The compact-valued correspondence H : X  Y is lower hemicontinuous if an only if it is lower
hemicontinuous at every x 2 X.
Definition A.3 [Continuity]: Let X and Y be complete separable metric spaces. The compact-
valued correspondence H : X  Y is continuous at x if and only if it is both upper and lower
hemicontinuous at x.
The compact-valued correspondence H : X  Y is continuous if an only if it is continuous at
every x 2 X.
14There are several dierent ways of characterizing upper and lower hemicontinuity. However,
Border (1985) shows that the sequential characterization used in Denitions A.1 and A.2 below
is equivalent to the more general denition, using upper and lower inverses, when the mapping is
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Definition A.4 [Equicontinuity]: Let (X;dX) and (Y;dY ) be complete separable metric spaces.
Let fz : X ! Y describe a family of functions from X to Y as z varies in Z. In other words, for
each given z 2 Z, fz is a function taking each point in X to a point in Y .
The family of functions fz : X ! Y is said to be equicontinuous at x if and only if for every
 > 0 there exists an  > 0 such that
dX(x;x)   ) dY [fz(x);fz(x)]   8z 2 Z (A.1)
A.2. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 [-Equilibrium Correspondence]: The fact that E is compact-valued is
immediate from (1), using the fact that C is compact-valued by Assumption 2 and R is continuous
by Assumption 3.
To see that E is upper hemicontinuous, consider a sequence fn;ng converging to (;), and
any corresponding sequence an with an 2 E(n;n) for every n, and let an converge to a. We need
to show that, necessarily, a 2 E(;).
The fact that a 2 C() is immediate from the fact that C is continuous by Assumption 2.
It remains to show that R(;a)  . But since an 2 E(n;n) for every n, we must have
that R(n;an)  n for every n. Since R is continuous by Assumption 3 this directly implies
R(;a)  , as required.
Proof of Lemma 3 [Continuity at  = 0]: By Lemma 1 we know that E() is upper hemi-
continuous. Using (1) it is immediate that if a 2 E(0), then a 2 E() for every  > 0. Therefore,
E() is lower hemicontinuous at  = 0. Hence it is continuous at  = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1 [Robustness and Stability]: We start by showing that robustness to
-Equilibria implies structural stability.
We proceed by contradiction. Assume that we can nd a model M that is robust to-Equilibria
but not structurally stable.
Since M is not structurally stable, we can nd some  2  such that E() is not lower
hemicontinuous at . It follows that we can nd a , an a 2 E(), a sequence n ! , and a
 > 0 such that
inf
a2E(n)
dA(a;a) >  8n (A.2)Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 30
By (1), a 2 E() implies a 2 C(). Therefore, since C is continuous and non-empty by
Assumption 2, we can also nd a sequence an ! a with an 2 C(n) for every n. Therefore (n;an)
2 G for every n. Since fn;ang ! (;a) by construction, and since R is continuous by Assumption
3, using the fact that a 2 E(), we can now conclude that as n ! 1 it must be the case that
R(n;an) ! 0. Therefore
8 > 0 9n such that n > n ) an 2 E(n;) (A.3)
Using (A.3) we now know that given any sequence k ! 0, we can nd subsequences n
k
!  and
an
k
! a such that
an
k
2 E(n
k
;k) 8k (A.4)
Using (2) to write out in full hA[E(n
k
;k); E(n
k
)], it is immediate to verify that (A.4) implies that
hA
h
E(n
k
;k);E(n
k
)
i
 inf
a2E(nk)
dA(an
k
;a) 8k (A.5)
Using the triangular inequality on the right-hand side of (A.5) now yields
hA
h
E(n
k
;k);E(n
k
)
i
 inf
a2E(nk)
h
dA(a;a)   dA(a;an
k
)
i
8k (A.6)
Using (A.2), from (A.6) we can then directly conclude that
hA
h
E(n
k
;k);E(n
k
)
i
    dA(an
k
;a) 8k (A.7)
Since, by construction, an
k
! a, we obviously have that dA(an
k
;a) ! 0. Using (A.7), it is
therefore clear that we have showed the following. Given any sequence n ! 0, we can nd some
 > 0 and a sequence n such that
hA[E(n;n);E(n)] >  8n (A.8)
Finally, notice that (A.8) directly contradicts (3) and hence contradicts the hypothesis that M is
robust to-Equilibria. Therefore, this is enough to conclude the proof that robustness to-Equilibria
implies structural stability.
To show that structural stability implies robustness to -Equilibria we proceed by contradiction
again. Let M be a model that is structurally stable but not robust to -Equilibria.Structural Stability and Bounded Rationality 31
Since M is not robust to -Equilibria we must be able to nd some  > 0, a sequence n and a
sequence n ! 0 with n > 0 for every n such that
hA[E(n;n);E(n)] >  8n (A.9)
Since it must always be the case that E(n)  E(n;n), (A.9) implies that we can now select some
sequence an with an 2 E(n;n) and an 62 E(n) for every n and nd some  > 0 such that
inf
a2E(n)
dA(an;a) >  8n (A.10)
Notice next that since an 2 E(n;n), we have that an 2 C(n) and R(n;an)  n for every n.
Since  and A are compact and n ! 0, using the continuity of C and R, we can now nd convergent
subsequences n
k
!  and an
k
! a such that a 2 C() and R(;a) = 0. Notice also that the
latter implies that a 2 E()
Since an
k
! a, (A.10) implies that
inf
a2E(nk)
dA(a;a)   8k (A.11)
Since a 2 E() this implies that
hA[E();E(n
k
)]   8k (A.12)
But since n
k
! , (A.12) clearly contradicts the fact that, since M is structurally stable, E must
be continuous at . This is enough to prove that every model that is structurally stable must also
be robust to -Equilibria. Hence the proof of the theorem is complete.
Proof of Remark 2 [Rational Equilibria and Perfect Equilibria]: By (1) and (4) it is
obvious that any Strict -Equilibrium is in fact an -Equilibrium.
The claim is now an immediate consequence of the fact that, by Lemma 1, for any given  2 ,
the -Equilibrium Correspondence is upper hemicontinuous at  = 0.
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